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A Little Violence 
In the aftermath of the turbulent 1960s, the United States 
was not the only country to express its national anxieties via a 
commission on the causes and prevention of violence. In April 
1976 French President Giscard d 'Estaing , responding to pub1 ic 
outcry, appointed a committee to study "violence, criminality, and 
delinquency," The committee included such luminaries as Jacques 
Ellul and Jean ~ourastig. Its' secretary, Roger Dumoulin, was a 
prefect. Before the committee finished work, its chair, Alain 
Peyrefitte, had become Minister of Justice. It was visibly a 
blue-ribbon committee. 
During the fifteen months of its existence, the committee 
held sixty-five plenary sessions and seven seminars. Testimony 
during the committee's hearings came from Gaston Defferre, Pierre 
Mauroy, Raymond Aron, Pierre Chaunu, Stanley Hoffmann, Edgar 
Morin, Robert Badinter, ~isgle Halimi, and many other national 
figures. The CGT gave political standing to the proceedings by 
refusing to send a witness. The commit.tee8s staff organized 
distinguished professional task forces and commissioned detailed 
reports. In short, the government was calling for serious advice 
on the control of violence. 
The rising sense of insecurity reflected in opinion polls and 
in protective behavior, said the committee, resulted from the 
spread of individual and collective violence. It was not the 
first time such a crisis had seized France, "Our country," they 
wrote, "is periodically subjected to antisocial surges which 
plunge. its people into anxiety, and even into anguish" (Peyrefitte 
et al. 1977: 43). Previous authorities had met those crises with 
repression and dissuasion; now, they suggested, was the time to 
worry about prevention of violence. To that end, they made a 
number of recommendations: building more integrated cities, 
reducing abuses of public power, moving capital to sites of 
underemployment, and so on. Their recommendations exuded 
cautious liberal good sense. 
Peyrefitte's blue-ribbon committee made the classic 
distinction between violence and legitimate force. Among'all uses 
of force, they tried to single out illegitimate abuses; those 
abuses qualified as genuine violence, The bulk of their effort 
dealt with individual violence, especially those that already 
qualified as crimes. The committee excluded war, political 
terrorism, and violent sports from their purview. Yet they 
identified part of the problem as collective and semi-legal. "In 
addition to criminal violence," ran the committee's general 
statement, 
we have ordinary violence, as if life itself were becoming 
violent. A new aggressiveness marks personal and social 
relations, Attacks are multiplying. Insult, physical 
threats, taking captives, and bombing are joining the arsenal 
of conflict. Breaking and sacking, often petty and 
gratuitous, are becoming ways of expressing oneself 
(~eyrefitte et al. 1977: 32). 
In the world of work, they mentioned taking captives, sitdown 
strikes, and sabotage. "In other sectors of public life," the 
committee continued, 
violence is establishing itself as normal operating 
procedure. To be sure, violent group reactions are nothing 
new. But they have recently become almost habitual means of 
"social dialogue." Occupational groups no longer hesitate 
to support their chief demands by violence (road barricades, 
blockage of ports, sacking of administrative offices, 
harassment of public employees . , . ) ; the committee notes 
regretfully that in such cases violence often pays, 
  elations between offices and their clients sometimes take a 
violent turn. People challenge a department via its agents. 
These are intermittent events, but the more spectacular 
because ordinarily peaceful citizens take part. For others, 
violence is a means of attracting attention, in order to 
publicize cultural, moral, or religious demands; all this is 
evidence that violence threatens to become a normal form of 
social relations (Peyrefitte et al. 88-89). 
Peyrefitte's committee could have gained from sharper definition 
of their subject matter. Sometimes they were analyzing collective 
action: the array of means people employ to act together on shared 
interests. Sometimes they were discussing the narrower band of 
collective action we can call contention: common action that bears 
directly on the interests of some other acting group. Sometimes 
they were singling out the even narrower strip of collective 
violence: that sort of contention in which someone seizes or 
damages persons or objects. 
The government's advisory committee did not argue that all 
contention was violent, or was becoming violent. They assumed 
that some forms of contention, such as electoral campaigns or the 
support of controversial programs by means of associations and 
orderly public meetings, deserved encouragement. Nevertheless, 
they fell into three quite debatable assumptions: 1) that violence 
is a coherent phenomenon with many interdependent variants, 2) 
that the use of one kind of violence tends to encourage the use of 
another, 3) that in the France of 1968 and beyond, violence was 
beginning to pervade public contention. 
The history of French contention makes it tempting to 
identify popular collective action with violence. In looking back 
over four centuries of French domestic conflict, we tend to recall 
violent moments : the seventeenth century's great civil wars, the 
Parisian journges of 1789, the uprisings of 1830, 1848, and 1871, 
the stifled right-wing demonstration of 6 ~ e b r u a r ~  P934. ,In 1622, 
when Louis XIII's judges had the severed head of rebel leader Jean 
de Lescun displayed at Royan's gate, its sightless eyes facing la 
Rochelle, they deliberately called attention to the violent side 
of collective action. The same is true of the workers who, on 23 
February 1848, loaded wagons with the corpses of comrades 
'massacred by soldiers of the Fourteenth Line Regiment, and wheeled 
their grisly advertisement through the city's streets for three 
hours. Both powerholders and rebels sometimes made death and 
vengeance seem central to the action. 
Likewise, the sheer number of fatalities in contention 
occasionally approaches the level of disaster. The 950 people 
killed in the Three Glorious Days of 1830, the 1,400 or more who 
died in the June Days of 1848, and the likely 20,000 Cornmunards of 
1871 who perished stain popular contention with blood. Those 
numbers terr i,fy . 
To Die, Contending or Otherwise 
Before linking contention and violence closely, however, we 
should consider three lessons of the long experience we have just 
surveyed. ,First, the vast majority of events involved no 
significant violence at all. If by "violence" we mean actual 
damage to persons or objects, then the usual seventeenth-century 
assembly to seek redress, the normal eighteenth-century charivari, 
the standard nineteenth-century strike, and the everyday 
twentieth-century demonstration all tended to pass with no more 
than occasional pushing and shoving. Over time, furthermore, 
French people have moved toward forms of collective action having 
less likelihood of generating violence. The expulsion of a tax 
collector or the invasion of an enclosed field starts closer to 
destruction than does a public meeting or a demonstration. 
Second, professional soldiers and police did the great bulk 
of the killing. The ratios of military to civilian deaths -- for 
example, the 163 military and 788 civilians reported killed during 
the successful Parisian rebellion of 27-29 July 1830 -- suggest as 
much. When insurgents failed, they usually suffered even higher 
proportions of the deaths. The actions of ordinary people were 
less violent than the casualties make it seem. 
Third, even in violent contention the scale of violence 
remains, with few exceptions, relatively small. V. Ts, Urlanis 
estimates the French troops killed and wounded during 
seventeenth-century wars at more than 500 thousand (Urlanis 1960: 
44). For the eighteenth century, his estimate is 1.4 million 
casualties, for the Napoleonic wars 226 thousand (Urlanis 1960: 
63, 91). ~uring the years from 1816 to 1980, Small and Singer 
count all interstate wars producing 1,000 battle deaths or more. 
By their counts, France led the entire world in number of wars 
fought (22) and proportion of time (3.71 months per year) at war 
during that period. Only Germany and Russia had more battle 
deaths; Small and Singer estimate France's battle deaths from 1816 
to 1980 at 1,965,120, about 12 thousand battle deaths per year 
(Small and Singer 1982: 168). 
These numbers dwarf the likely figures for casualties in 
France's internal struggles, The Small-Singer tabulation for 
civil wars involving 1,000 or more deaths (military and civilian 
alike) includes France's combats of 1830, 1848, and 1871. In that 
tabulation, France appears with 24,700 battle deaths (Small and 
singer 1982: 276). According to those figures, from 1816 to 1980 
eighty times as many French people died in international wars as 
in major civil wars. 
Why concentrate on deaths? We have good practical reasons 
for doing so. So long as a rough correlation exists between the 
number of deaths and the extent of other destruction, deaths 
provide one of the more reliable indicators of violence's general 
extent. Deaths are less ambiguous than injuries or property 
damage. They are also more likely to be reported with care. 
Outside of rebellions and other forms of popular contention, 
violent deaths occur in the guise of war, legal execution, 
homicide, suicide, and accident. Assignments of deaths to one 
category or another always leave room for argument, but rough 
estimates exist for each of these categories back into the 
nineteenth century (Chesnais 1976, passim) . 
In 1830, for example, about 1,000 French people died in 
popular contention -- 950 of them in the Parisian uprising of 
27-29 July. That year France was officially at peace; only the 
400-odd troops killed in the conquest of Algeria weigh in the 
category of war. We lack homicide figures for 1830. But the 
official statistics include 1,756 deaths through suicide that 
year, and 4,478 from accidents. Popular contention -- including 
the killing of civilians by troops -- accounted for no more than 
one violent death in eight. 
In 1848, when popular contention brought approximately 1,900 
deaths (1,400 or so in the June Days alone), France was again 
officially at peace, and her recently victorious troops suffered 
negligible losses in Algeria. That year, by government report, 
3,301 French people killed themselves, Another 8,218 died in 
accidents. Indeed, the 3,554 drownings in that total amounted to 
almost twice as many deaths as those caused by the conflicts of 
the revolution. 
Reverse the picture; take a year with a war, but no 
revolution. During 1854 to 1856, France was very much at war in 
the Crimea. Just over 10,000 French troops died violent deaths in 
those three years. Another 85,000 died of cholera, typhus, 
lingering wounds, or some combination of the three. Meanwhile, 
the national statistics for the three years reported 11,700 
suicides and 28,500 accidental deaths. During the Crimean War, 
under Napoleon 111's tight control, metropolitan France saw little 
popular, contention of any kind. Not one person died in a 
collective confrontation. 
1871? More than 21,000 deaths -- probably France's all-time 
high -- in'popular contention. Almost all of them occurred in the 
bloody liquidation of the Paris Commune. But in 1871 France also 
lost about 77,000 of its citizens to the Franco-Prussian war, not 
to mention about 4,000 suicides and 14,000 accidental deaths. 
Even the crushing of the Paris Commune did not bring the share of 
civil contention up to a fifth of all France's violent deaths. - 
Despite the rapidly increasing pace of strikes and 
demonstrations, the twentieth century brought a decisive decline 
in fatalities from civil conflict. Yet war killed more than ever 
before. Some 1.3 million French people died in World War I and 
600 thousand in World War 11. The French lost about 26,000 troops 
and police in the postwar liberation struggles of Indochina and 
Algeria, plus thousands more in deaths outside of combat. As the 
automobile gained ground in France, road deaths alone rose from 
around 2,500 per year at the start of the century to their toll of 
around 15,000 per year .in the 1970s. In short, thousands of 
French people died violent deaths during every twentieth-century 
year. In those same years, it was rare for anyone at all to die 
in popular contention. 
Perhaps a significant share of the extraordinary 6,455 
homicides in the Liberation year 1944 (compared with a "normal" 
level of 336 per year from 1946 to 1950) should count as outcomes 
of popular contention. If so, 1944 probably qualifies not only as 
France's all-time record year for homicide, but also as the 
twentieth century's most lethal year for contention among French 
people. 
Similarly, the 1,009 homicides in 1961 -- second highest 
total between 1930 and 1972 -- surely include some settling of 
accounts concerning the French withdrawal from Algeria. 1961 was 
also a turbulent year for collective contention, with widespread 
farmers' movements, numerous demonstrations concerning North 
Africa, large brawls at rock concerts, and strikes including 
occupations of mines. Yet during the year only 7 or 8 people died 
in collective confrontations. At the same time, official 
statistics reported 7,300 suicides, 11,000 traffic deaths, and 
18,000 other people killed in accidents of various sorts. 
During the vast mobilization of May-June 1968, at most a 
dozen deaths resulted directly from the thousands of strikes, 
demonstrations, and occupations. By adopting a fairly broad 
definition of "direct victim", Delale and Ragache manage to get 
these twelve people onto their death register (Delale & Ragache 
24 May 1968, Paris: A grenade hit Philippe Matherion, a 
housing manager, at a barricade in the rue des Ecoles. 
24 May, Lyon: A truck pushed by demonstrators struck Rene 
Lacroix, a police officer. 
30 May, Mont Pincon (Calvados): A gendarme fired a shell 
which struck Rene Trzepalkowski, a worker. 
7 June, Grenoble: Someone shot Mathieu Mathei, a barkeeper, 
in the back; this may have been an underworld execution. 
10 June., Flins: Gilles Tautin, a lyce/e student, drowned 
escaping a charge by riot police. 
11 June., Sochaux-Montbeliard: Riot police shot,Pierre Beylot, 
an automobile worker. The same day, Henri Blanchet, another 
automobile worker, fell to his death from a ledge during a 
grenade attack. 
' 22 June, Martinique: An unnamed person died in an electoral 
brawl. 
28 June, Vernon (Eure): A deserter from the Foreign Legion 
assassinated Jean-Claude Lemire, a delivery truck driver who 
had been a leading Katangais, or right-wing thug, at the 
Sorbonne in May. 
30 June, Arras: Right-wing commandos killed Marc Lanvin, 
warehouse worker and Communist, as he posted election bills. 
1 July, Guadeloupe: Molotov cocktails burned Gaetan Popotte 
and Remy Lollia as they were returning from an electoral 
rally. 
A slightly tighter definition would reduce the roster to five or 
six of these deaths, In either case, the number is tiny by 
comparison with 9 million strikers and even more demonstrators who 
made the events of May and June 1968. The significance of these 
events clearly does not lie in the sheer quantity of violence they 
entailed. ' 
How Contention Matters 
Yet they matter. Somehow they matter more than the accidents 
that cost so many lives. They matter because French people -- of 
all political persuasions and powers -- themselves scanned 
contentious events for political messages. The deaths themselves 
were incidental. But people interpreted the readiness of 
participants to commit themselves and risk harm as signs 
concerning the probability of new struggles for power, or new 
outcomes to old struggles for power. Open contention produced 
information about the intentions and capacities of all claimants 
to power -- governmental authorities, opponents and rivals of the 
government, contenders for some particular interest, groups of 
ordinary people seeking just enough space to live their lives 
peacefully, 
In any particular confrontation, existing powerhoIders tended 
to retain their power; existing inequalities and in justices were 
likely to stay in place. Yet in a significant minority of trials, 
ordinary people made gains or avoided losses: the harassed tax 
collector actually left town for a while, the seizure of grain 
produced a modest increase in the local food supply, the sitdown 
strike exacted concessions from management. 
For us, too, they matter. The record of popular contention 
provides us with one of our surer guides to the experiences of 
ordinary people who faced great changes. Did French people react 
to the massive proletarianization of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries? Consult the poor cultivators of Languedoc who, in the 
waning eighteenth century, fought the private appropriation of 
forests and common fields. Ask the Parisian artisans and skilled 
workers of 1848 who demanded the "organization ,of work" to 
maintain a semblance of workerst autonomy and control. 
Did the enormous growth of the French state make much 
difference to the lives of ordinary people? Consider the 5,000 
citizens of the privileged Boulonnais who rose against the king's 
illegal "regularization" of their taxes in 1662. Reflect on the 
rebellion of some 100,000 people in Anjou and nearby regions 
against the revolutionary state during 1793. In the absence of 
surveys and elctions, ordinary people speak their collective minds 
in contention. Even in the era of surveys and elections, popular 
contention sends political messages other channels do not carry. 
Let us not exaggerate. Among people outside the great 
centers of power, not everyone has equal access to the microphone. 
When we look closely at "popular" contention, we repeatedly find 
local leaders, agitators, animators, organizers. ~n general, with 
equal interests at stake, skilled workers are generally better 
prepared to act than unskilled workers, propertied farmers better 
positioned to pool their efforts than their migrant workers. 
Because collective action rests on organization and often costs 
plenty, furthermore, many people bear injustices, deprivations, 
and broken dreams with resignation or silent anger. The record of 
French popular contention brings us closer to the continuous 
experience of ordinary people than do the pronouncements of 
politicians and philosophers. Still it underrepresents the 
experience of those who mobilize least easily -- who are very 
likely those who suffer most. Within these limits, over the very 
long run the story of French popular contention broadcasts how 
much the growth of the state and the development of capitalism 
occurred at the expense of ordinary people. 
What Happened in History? 
Neither reactions to capitalism nor responses to the state 
remained constant, however. Although twentieth-century 
winegrowers demanded action and twentieth-century shopkeepers 
organized against taxes, during the twentieth century no events 
remotely resembling the Boulonnais' Lustucru rebellion of 1662 or 
Languedoc's eighteenth-century invasions of enclosed commons have 
occurred. If we look back from 1984 to 1598, we see a seventeenth 
century filled with struggles of Protestants and regional 
powerholders to maintain their autonomy in the face of an 
aggressively expanding crown, battles of local people to resist 
the rising demands for resources of a warmaking state, and that 
interlocked network of conflicts we call the Fronde. 
Later, we observe an eighteenth century replete with contests 
for control of food, of land, of labor. There, we find 
capitalists, who figured in seventeenth-century struggles largely 
as fiscal agents for the state, playing an independent part as 
accumulators of land and capital; at the century's close, we also 
discover a series of fights for control of the state that 
temporarily alter the whole tempo and timbre of popular collective 
action and permanently change the relative power of major social 
classes with respect to the state as well as the state's own 
penetration into everyday life. 
Continuing, we witness a nineteenth century in which the 
divisions between labor and increasingly concentrated capital, as 
well as between those groups enjoying the state's protection and 
those the state held in check, became fundamental to a wide range 
of contention. In the course of that century, we follow a series 
of challenges to the national structure of power from shifting 
coalitions of bourgeois and organized workers. The challenges 
ended in the partial incorporation of organized workers into the 
national structure of power, and in the near-elimination of the 
Catholic Church from that structure of power. 
We, the observers, live a twentieth century in which the 
involvement of national, politically active associations in the 
pursuit of shared interests -- already visible in the nineteenth 
century -- has become overwhelming. Amid the incessant activity 
of organized workers and organized capitalists, beside the 
increasing tendency of people to organize their demands in 
national strike waves and social movements, we notice the widening 
activity of students, intellectuals, government employees, 
independent farmers, shopkeepers, and service workers. If the 
changing organization of capital and the expanding power of the 
state set the main terms of popular contention throughout the four 
centuries, the move from one century to the next certainly did not 
bring more of the same. 
Bins labeled "seventeenth century," or "twentieth century," 
however, do not contain these many changes neatly. Considering 
the forms and actors in popular collective action, we can make out 
major accelerations of change around the Fronde and the Revolution 
of 1848, as well as secondary accelerations at the 
eighteenth-century Revolution and at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Around the time of the Fronde, the regional 
powerholders who had long been crucial to popular collective 
action began to withdraw from popular alliances and, to accept 
subordination (at a handsome price) to the crown; in the process, 
local assemblies lost importance as vehicles for popular 
collective action, mutinies of various sorts lost much of their 
efficacity, and urban or regional rebellions faded rapidly. 
I£ we needed a single date to mark that transition, 1661 
would serve even better than 1648; in 1661 the great statemaking 
duo of Colbert and Louis XIV took on the task of making the French 
state unchallenged in its own domain, and feared throughout the 
world. As Colbert's successors, in collaboration with great 
merchants and capitalist farmers, pressed to give national market 
and mobile capital priority over local claims to commodities, 
land, and labor, seizures of grain and related forms of resistance 
to the dominance of capital multiplied. 
With the Revolution of 1789 and beyond, two contradictory 
changes occurred. On the one hand, the massive popular 
mobilization aga-inst the claims of capitalists and the state from 
1787 to about 1793 churned out a remarkable set of innovations in 
popular collective action: committees, militias, assemblies, 
clubs, participatory festivals, parades, ce'remonies, invasions of 
legislatures, symbolic destruction, people's courts; in one way or 
another, they acted out the idea of popular sovereignty. 
On the other hand, the relatively small number of organized 
bourgeois who actually seized control of the state apparatus soon 
acted to contain and channel popular collective action; in so 
doing they first extended state structure into direct rule at the 
level of the individual community and then built a centralized 
apparatus of surveillance and control. The new state structure 
would have been the envy of any so-called Absolutist ruler. The 
state's reshaping checked the wave of collective-action 
innovation, and returned France to the forms of struggle that had 
prevailed before the Revolution, 
Around the Revolution of 1848 and Louis Napoleon's seizure of 
power in 1851, nevertheless, our four centuries' largest 
transformations of the forms and personnel of popular collective 
action worked themselves out. As capital imploded and state 
centralization speeded up, contention itself shifted toward 
national arenas, Local forms of resistance to capitalist claims 
such as the grain seizure and the collective invasion of posted 
forests virtually disappeared. Local mocking routines such as 
charivari and the tendentious Mardi Gras pageant lost their raison 
d'gtre. . Popular judicial proceedings, destruction of toll gates, 
forced illuminations, attacks on machines, pulling down and 
sacking of private houses, and intervillage battles rapidly became 
antique. More slowly, but just as definitively, the 
community-wide turnout gave way to the firm-by-firm strike. 
Electoral campaigns, strikes, planned insurrections, 
demonstrations, and public meetings quickly came to dominate 
popular collective action. 
Lesser transformations swung on the hinge of 1905-1907. With 
the displacement of the state church, the partial establishment of 
labor as an organized political force at a national scale, the 
national strike wave of 1906 and the southern winegrowers' 
mobilization of 1907, changes that had already emerged part way in 
the nineteenth-century transition appeared in full light: the 
great place of parties, unions, and other national associations in 
the organization of popular collective action; the increasing 
prominence of wage-workers in large organizations as participants 
in contention; the deliberate creation of social movements 
spanning large regions or the country as a whole; the development 
of countrywide strike waves strongly involving agents of the 
state. 
Has another transition come upon us? Three kinds of evidence 
might make us think so: 1) the heightened importance in recent 
decades of plant occupations, hostage-taking, urban guerrilla, 
hijacking, road blockades, crop-dumpings, takeovers of public 
buildings, collective squatting, mass picketing and other 
deliberate occupations of spaces and the people in them; 2) the 
extraordinary innovations -- internal assemblies, strike 
committees, graffiti etc. -- of May-June 1968; 3) the greatly 
increased use of mass media by all parties to popular collective 
action. 
Especially since 1968, French observers have often claimed 
that new, post-industrial, or style-of-life forms have taken over. 
Alain Touraine, for example, declares that: 
fresh upsurges are being felt, new thrusts forward, which 
have not yet been defined or which refuse to be defined by 
social relations: these include the rejection of an 
industrial society grown overwhelmingly crushing, the return 
to the lost great times of stability, the anguish of crisis 
and the fear of catastrophe, freedom movements of all kinds 
for the assertion of identity but without clear definition of 
their opponents, and liberal or libertarian critiques of the 
state (Touraine 1981: 1). 
Within the realm of industrial conflict, Pierre Dubois 
distinguishes between two types of radicalism -- explosive direct 
attacks on management, and planned assertions of workers' rights. 
The 1970s revival of explosive radicalism, he suggests, was 
temporary, while planned radicalism "is an entirely novel form 
that has some chances of being pursued'' (Dubois 1978: 11) . Worker 
takeovers of plants, such as the famous opposition to the closing 
of the Lip factory, and the deliberate, coordinated 
disorganization of production, serve as examples. 
Looked at closely, however, almost all of the cases in point 
involve forms of action that already have their own histories. 
The novelty consists of different groups or different demands. 
within industrial conflict, for example, the strike continues to 
dominate workers' collective action, but white-collar and 
high-technology workers become more involved, and some groups of 
workers demand a say in decisions concerning production and 
investment. Again, demands for regional autonomy, sexual rights, 
or freedom to pursue a distinctive style of life have become more 
prominent since World War 11, yet the proponents of those demands 
have typically presented them by means of demonstrations, marches, 
and similar routines that were already prominent in the later 
nineteenth century. 
Repertoires of Collective Action 
The great change, then, occurred in the nineteenth century. 
It is convenient to call what happened a change in repertoire. 
Remember the meaning of the term. Any population has a limited 
repertoire of collective action: alternative means of acting 
together on shared interests. In our time, for example, most 
people know how to participate in an electoral campaign, join or 
form a special-interest association, organize a letter-writing 
drive, demonstrate, strike, hold a meeting, build an influence 
network, and so on. 
These varieties of action constitute a repertoire in 
something like the theatrical or musical sense of the word -- but 
the repertoire in question resembles that of commedia dell'arte or 
jazz more than that of a strictly classical ensemble. People know 
the general rules of performance more or less well, and vary the 
performance to meet the purpose at hand. Every performance 
involves at least two parties -- an initiator and an object of the 
action. Third parties often get involved; even when they are not 
the object of collective action, for example, agents of the state 
spend a good deal of their time monitoring, regulating, 
facilitating, and repressing different sorts of collective action. 
The existing repertoire constrains collective action; far 
from the image we sometimes hold of mindless crowds, people tend 
to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of existing 
forms, and to miss many opportunities available to them in 
principle. That constraint results in part from the advantages of 
familiarity, partly from the investment of second and third 
parties in the established forms of collective action, Although 
it may seem otherwise, even government officials and industrial 
managers of our own time generally behave as though they preferred 
demonstrations and strikes to utterly unconventional forms of 
collective action. 
Our fullest accounts of French collective action dwell on its 
more discontinuous and public forms: striking, demonstrating, 
occupying, and so on rather than building influence networks or 
operating special-interest organizations, Although changes in 
continuous and private forms of collective action have also been 
profound, they are harder to document than are relatively 
discontinuous public forms. 
The main reasons for that difference in documentation are 
simple and important: First, in most of the discontinuous and 
public forms of action the point is to make a statement of some 
kind. Deliberate public statements tend to leave behind more 
documentation than other varieties of collective action. Second, 
authorities generally monitor and seek to control discontinuous 
and public forms because of their implicit claims on the existing 
structure of power. Hence surveillance reports, instructions to 
spies .and police, memoranda to interior ministers and the like 
fill the archives of former authorities. 
What do those archives tell us? Some time in the nineteenth 
century, the people of France shed the collective-action 
repertoire they had been using for two centuries or so, and 
adopted the repertoire they still use today. France's people did 
not complete a definitive shift to the new repertoire until the 
1850s. 
What was the difference? Broadly speaking, the repertoire of 
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries held to a parochial scope: 
It addressed local actors or the local representatives of national 
actors. It also relied heavily on patronage -- appealing to 
immediately available powerholders to convey grievances or settle 
disputes, temporarily acting in the place of unworthy or inactive 
powerholders only to abandon power once the action was done. For 
all their labeling as "riots" and "disorders", seizures of grain, 
invasions. of fields, machine-breaking and similar actions had a 
common logic and an internal order. Figure 1 summarizes the 
characteristics of the older repertoire. 
. . 
The repertoire that, crystallized in the nineteenth century 
and prevails today is, in general, more national in scope: 
~lthough available for local issues 'and enemies, it lends itself 
easily to coordination among many localities. As compared with 
the older repertoire, its actions are relatively autonomous: 
Instead of staying in the shadow of existing powerholders and 
adapting routines sanctioned by those powerholders, users of the 
new repertoire tend to initiate their own statements of grievances 
and demands. Strikes, demonstrations, electoral rallies and 
FIGURE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REPERTOIRE OF 
POPULAR COLLECTIVE ACTION IN FRANCE, ROUGHLY 1650-1850 
1. people's frequent employment of the authorities' normal means 
of action, either as caricature or as a deliberate, if 
temporary, assumption of the authorities' prerogatives in the 
name of the local community 
2. common appearance of participants as members or 
representatives of constituted corporate - groups and 
communities rather than of special interests 
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3. a tendency to appeal to power patrons for redress of wrongs 
and, especially, for representation vis a vis outside 
authorities 
4. extensive use of authorized public celebrations and assemblies 
for the presentation of grievances and demands 
5. repeated adoption of. rich, irreverent symbolism in the.form of 
effigies, dumb show, and ritual objects to state grievances 
and demands 
6. convergence on the residences of wrongdoers and the sites of 
wrongdoing, as opposed to seats and symbols of public power 
seizures of grain = "food riots" 
collective invasions of forbidden fields, forests, and 
streams 
destruction of toll gates and other barriers 
attacks on machines 
charivari, serenade 
expulsions of tax officials, foreign workers, and other 
outsiders 
tendentious holiday parades 
intervillage battles 
pulling down and'sacking of private houses 
forced illumination 
acting out of popular judicial proceedings 
turnout 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: PAROCHIAL AND PATRONIZED 
similar actions build, in general, on much more deliberately- 
constructed organization than used to be the case. Figure 2 
characterizes the contemporary repertoire. 
The social movement, as we know it, came into being with the 
new repertoire. The social movement consists of a series of 
challenges to established authorities, especially national 
authorities, in the name of an unrepresented constituency. Its 
concrete actions combine various elements of the newer repertoire: 
public meetings, demonstrations, marches, strikes, and so on; they 
couple with an attempt by leaders to link the actions 
organizationally and symbolically, as well as to bargain with 
established authorities on behalf of their claimed constituency. 
Although it does not have the official standing of an electoral 
campaign or a petition drive, the deliberately-organized social 
movement occupies a recognized place in France's contemporary 
array of means for acting .collectively. The vast, linked 
demonstrations of Languedocts winegrowers in 1907 and the 
coordinated road-blocking and potato-dumping of Brittany's farmers 
in 1961 illustrate vividly the operation of social movements. 
Those who claim to speak for the same social movements often 
divide and compete. They vary enormously in their actual 
relationship to the constituencies they boast. In the 1950s and 
1960s, such closely-linked orga'nizers such as Henri ~ o r ~ z r e s  and 
Pierre Poujade never could adjudicate who spoke for whom. Yet on 
public occasions, they often managed to put up a common front. 
FIGURE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REPERTOIRE OF 
POPULAR COLLECTIVE ACTION IN FRANCE, ROUGHLY 1850-1980 
1. the employment of relatively autonomous means of action, of a 
kind rarely or never employed by authorities 
2, frequent appearance of special interests and named 
associations or pseudo-associations (e.g Coalition for 
Justice, People United Against 1 
3 .  direct challenges to rivals or authorities, especially 
national authorities and their representatives, rather than 
appeals to patrons 
4, deliberate organization of assemblies for the articulation of 
claims 
5, display of programs, slogans, signs of common membership 








invasions of official assemblies 
social movements 
electoral campaigns 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: NATIONAL AND AUTONOMOUS 
Social movements focus, precisely, on manufacturing the appearance 
of unified, simultaneous challenge by means of disparate, shifting 
coalitions. 
This complex of action was virtually unknown in western 
countries until the nineteenth century. Before then, although 
rebellions great and small occurred repeatedly, practically no one 
tried to combine seizures of grain, field invasions, turnouts, and 
the like into visibly sustained challenges to established 
authorities. Then' the social movement became commonplace. On 
balance, its action was national in scope and autonomous with 
respect to powerholders. 
The dichotomies parochial/national and patronage/autonomy 
simplify radically in two different ways. First, each cuts a 
genuine continuum into just a pair of categories. In fact, real 
strikes, demonstrations, and the like are more or less national 
and autonomous, not clearly one or the other. Second, the 
transition to more national and autonomous forms of action did not 
occur instantly and simultaneously. It was the net effect of many 
moves and counter-moves, occurring at different times for 
different places and types of collective action. 
Turnouts, for example, were the routines by which workers in 
a given craft who had a grievance against the employers of their 
locality went from shop to shop within the locality, calling out 
the workers to join them in a march through the town, ended the 
circuit with a meeting at the edge of town, voted to make a 
certain set of demands, sent a delegation to the employers, 
declared a work stoppage, and enforced it as best they could 
throughout the town until they reached an agreement with the 
employers. The turnout was relatively local in scope. It put 
pressure on nearby patrons -- both the employers and the local 
authorities. 
The firm-by-firm strike, as we know it, covers a whole town, 
a whole industry, or even a whole country in exceptional 
circumstances. Yet the main action generally occurs within and 
just outside a single workplace. Larger French strikes, it is 
true, often incorporate a routine reminiscent of the turnout: a 
parade through all shops, sweeping up (if possible) workers who 
have remained at their posts. Yet that action aims at a single 
employer, not at the owners of the trade as a whole. Strikes also 
allow workers to state their grievances and hopes independently of 
conversations with their immediate employers; by striking, they 
can send messages to the government or to the citizenry at large. 
On the average, although only on the average, routines in the 
newer repertoire such as strikes, demonstrations, and public 
meetings involve less dependence on existing powerholders and 
greater scope than routines such as turnouts, field invasions, and 
seizures of grain. That is the point of calling the "new" 
repertoire relatively antonomous and national. ~igure 3 lays out 







FIGURE 3: "OLDn AND "NEW' REPERTOIRES IN FRANCE 


















Why the prevailing repertoire of popular collective action 
underwent the change from relatively parochial and patronized to 
relatively national and autonomous is simple to state in principle 
and complex to show in practice. In principle, the shift occurred 
because the interests and organization of ordinary people shifted 
away from local affairs and powerful patrons to national affairs 
and major concentrations of power and capital. As capitalism 
advanced, as national states became more powerful and centralized, 
local affairs and nearby patrons mattered less to the fates of 
ordinary people. Increasingly, holders of large capital and 
national power made the decisions that affected them. As a 
result, seizures of grain, collective invasions of fields and the 
like became ineffective, irrelevant, obsolete. In response to the 
shifts of power and capital, ordinary people invented and adopted 
new forms of action, creating the electoral campaign, the public 
meeting, the social movement, and the other elements of the newer 
repertoire. 
Although the shift in repertoires followed the logic of 
change in power and capital, each form and each actor had a 
particular history. The firm-by-firm strike took on its 
recognizable characteristics in concrete labor-management 
struggles as capital concentrated in locality after locality. 
Because the particular histories are quite different, the common 
processes creating the demonstration and the strike only appear in 
perspective, at a distance. Nevertheless, in case after case it 
is clear, that the common processes involved concentration -- 
concentration of capital, concentration of political power. That 
concentration altered the possibilities and forms of popular 
collective action. From the perspectives of individual actors, it 
altered their internal organization and their opportunity to act 
collectively. 
Statemaking and capitalism did not merely shape organization 
and opportunity. They also dominated the fluctuating interests of 
different groups in collective action. The French state grew 
immensely in bulk and complexity; it grew in spurts such as the 
Revolution and the Empire, but it almost never stopped growing. 
Nor did it ever stop extending i'ts power to coerce and extract. 
Great state-builders such as Richelieu, Napoleon and de Gaulle 
left no heritage more obvious than the state's enlarged capacity 
to enter the lives of its citizens. 
The process of statemaking affecting French people's 
interests, and therefore stimulated popular collective action when 
organization and opportunity permitted, in three ways: 1) by 
making direct claims on valued resources, as when the 
revolutionary state seized church properties in 1791 and 
thereafter; 2) by competing with rival governments and 
quasi-governments, as when Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert 
squeezed out the liberties of cities and towns in the king's name; 
3) by fostering competition among contenders for its favors, 
resources, and protections, as when employers and workers 
simultaneously sought to bend the Popular Front government of 
1936. Since the rhythm of these processes was uneven -- those who 
controlled the state were, after all, also responding to 
fluctuations in their own organization, opportunity, and interest 
-- popular contention in response to statemaking rose and fell 
like the waves in a narrow, wind-stirred channel. 
The process that eventually produced today's state-mediated 
capitalism in France passed through many stages. Its master 
trends ran toward the concentration of capital, toward the 
proletarianization of the labor force, and therefore toward a 
sharpening polarization between capital and labor. The resulting 
conflicts of interest generated popular collective action in three 
different ways. First, there was the sharpening division of 
interest ' between capital and labor itself, as when 
nineteenth-century textile manufacturers cut wages to meet foreign 
competition, and workers fought to maintain their incomes. 
Second, there was the competition between capitalists and other 
claimants on commodities and on factors of production, as in the 
stimulation of grain seizures by merchants' attempts to ship grain 
to distant and profitable markets, or to withhold grain from local 
markets until the price was advantageous. Third, there was 
competition among participants in the same factor markets, as in 
the attacks of organized local workers on outsiders brought in to 
cut wages or break strikes. 
Such conflicts of interest endure over long periods, but do 
not produce continuous streams of open content ion; contention 
comes in fits and starts. That is partly because organization and 
opportunity fluctuate as the parties to conflicts of interest lead 
their regular lives. ~t is partly because the parties constantly 
make strategic adjustments to each other's moves. It is partly 
because third parties -- for example, the state in 
management-labor conflicts -- likewise make moves that affect the 
organization and opportunity of the parties. It is also because 
change in the behavior of one of the parties has an exceptional 
power to attract response from another party. Although 
seventeenth-century French people avoided taxes whenever they 
could do so safely, they were especially inclined to band together 
for resistance when the monarchy or its tax farmers imposed a new 
illegal tax that would require yet another round of sacrifices and 
improvisations. 
To resort again to a great simplification,, the four centuries 
we have been examining break into two very broad phases of 
struggle. In the first, we find capitalist property being created 
as statemakers struggled to extract resources -- especially 
. resources for warmaking -- and to quell their rivals. In that 
phase, the dominant issues of popular collective action were 
expropriation, imposition of state control, laying down of 
capitalisst control, and resistance to all of them. 
In the second phase, within the framework of capitalist 
property and a strong state, we find major themes of popular 
contention to be struggles between labor and capital , competition 
within markets, and collective efforts to control the state and 
its resources. Speaking very generally, the "old" repertoire 
belongs to the first phase, the contemporary repertoire to the 
second. 
Five Regions Tell Their Stories 
The Ile de France, Languedoc, Anjou, Flanders, and Burgundy 
all lived the growth of the French state and the development of 
world capitalism. ~ l l  five regions underwent the great 
transformation of popular collective-action repertoiresduring the 
nineteenth century. All of them, in their ways, survived Louis 
XIII1s military expansion, the Fronde, the struggles of Catholics 
with Protestants, the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848, the 
formation of nation-wide strike movements, the Popular Front, the 
Occupation and Liberation, the days of May-June 1968. Yet the 
history of each region provides a different experiment in the 
interconnection of capitalism, statemaking, and popular 
contention. 
In the Ile de France we witness the enormous work of 
concentration most directly. Throughout the four centuries after 
1598, Paris remained the chief prize of French political struggle; 
unless rooted out quickly, those who mastered Paris controlled 
France. From the seventeenth century onward, the concentration of 
capital and of coercive power only increased the stakes. 
Most of the struggle for possession of the capital pitted one 
group of national powerholders against another. Nevertheless, 
from time to time a coalition of relatively powerless people with 
dissidents from the national power structure managed to seize the 
city, even to topple those who controlled the state. During the 
Fronde, the journees of 1789, the Three Glorious Days of July 
1830, the February Revolution of 1848, the Revolution of 1870, the 
Commune of 1871 and (to a lesser extent) the general strike of 
May-June 1936 or the mass occupations of May-June 1968, national 
power balanced on popular collective action in Paris and the Ile 
de France. 
We see changes: the Fronde was the last occasion on which a 
coalition of regional lords seriously threatened to wrest control 
of the national state away from its current holders. The threat 
of the Parlements in 1787 or 1788 pales by comparison. If the 
Parisian movement had been entirely independent and successful on 
one occasion or another, France might have had a government of 
great lords in 1653, of magistrates, merchants, master artisans 
and shopkeepers in 1788, of bourgeois, shopkeepers, and masters in 
1793, of artisans, skilled large-shop workers, intellectuals, and 
professionals' in 1848 or 1871, of organized large-shop workers, 
intellectuals, and professionals in 1936, of a similar set plus 
students and government employees in 1968. 
Although from the eighteenth century onward ~arisian workers 
mobilized with exceptional effectiveness, the contention of 
eighteenth-century shopworkers, with its reliance on 
semi-clandestine craft gilds, wineshop gatherings, ceremonies, 
blacklists, and turnouts, bears little resemblance to 
twentieth-century negotiating among competing unions, government 
officials, political party executives, and half-organized factory 
workers having their own grievances and conditions for action. 
The main common properties are that in the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries alike proximity to national powerholders and 
the ability, on occasion, to shut down the capital gave workers of 
Paris and vicinity leverage they shared with no one else. In the 
twentieth century, social-movement organizers from elsewhere in 
France recognized that primacy regularly: to cap their challenges, 
they brought demonstrators and symbols of distress from provincial 
capitals to Paris itself. 
Languedoc certainly shared in national struggles for power: 
Louis XIII1s steely insistence on the beheading of the rebel Duc 
de Montmorency in Toulouse, back in 1632, testifies to the 
importance of that province's rebellions. Languedoc also had its 
own distinctive existence. Big Languedoc contained several 
different kinds of economy, each of which experienced the state's 
growth and the development of capitalism in a distinctive way. In 
southwestern (Upper) Languedoc, we see the growth of agrarian 
capitalism during the seventeenth and, especially, eighteenth 
century. There, the division of the population into a few 
substantial landlords and a mass of smallholders or wage-laborers, 
the alliance and overlap of landlords with officeholders, the 
9 
containment of urban powerholders by the agrarian and official 
elites shaped popular politics for two centuries or more. 
In northeastern (Lower) Languedoc, smaller-scale and less 
prosperous agriculture accompanied the proliferation of cottage 
industry centered on small but active commercial centers. The 
large Protestant population clustered disproportionately along the 
cottage-industry network, among poor rural outworkers and rich 
urban entrepreneurs. In Upper Languedoc, swings in the economic 
viability of textile manufacturing strongly influenced the rhythms 
of popular contention. The region's long, irregular 
deindustrialization meant that small entrepreneurs and workers 
were often on the defensive. The division between Protestant and 
Catholic added bitterness to many of Upper Languedoc's struggles 
-- especially when the national state undertook to protect, 
destroy, or disestablish one religious group or.the other. 
The nineteenth- and twentieth-century growth of large-scale 
wine production further proletarianized the rural population, 
reshaped all Languedoc's social geography, and laid the basis for 
new varieties of popular politics. From the later nineteenth 
century onward, Languedoc became France's prime region of 
organized agrarian radicalism, as well as the source of repeated 
large challenges to national agricultural policy. Although the 
wage-workers on the capitalist farms in paris' hinterland 
sometimes organized in alliance with national labor federations 
based in the capital, they never rivaled the scale of Languedoc's 
agrarian collective action. 
Anjou? In that small province the historic divisions 
operated on a smaller scale than in Languedoc. But the divisions 
were more tenacious. ~hrough most of the four centuries after 
1598, large landholders dominated the bocage and looked to Angers 
as their social base. Acting as rentiers rather than full-blown 
agricultural capitalists, they let substantial peasants generate 
their incomes from medium-sized farms with the help of 
smallholders and day-laborers. Meanwhile, with the rise of the 
slave trade small merchants built up an extensive rural linen 
industry; through many vicissitudes, household and small-scale 
rural manufacturing remain important sources of income for the 
region's people today. The Loire Valley and connected areas 
supported a very different economy; industrial crops and 
winegrowing sustained a dense population of smallholders, 
wage-workers, merchants and ' - -  until the Revolution -- 
ecclesiastics. 
Anjou's popular' collective action reflected its enduring 
.divisions. In a region long subordinated to the crown, there was 
little opportunity for urban rebels to garner support from local 
elites; the Fronde, with its divisions among the region's great 
powerholders, offered only a temporary exception. The artisanal 
and mercantile populations of Angers found few allies elsewhere in 
the region, but managed to act on their own. The people of the 
bocage raised a great rebellion against the agents of the 
 evolution, then accepted the patronage of landlords who returned 
to their estates after the Revolution, That agrarian alliance 
underlay the region's resistance to the Catholic Church's 
disestablishment. 
In the valley and adjacent areas, moderate and republican 
. politics established a small base. As a result, clashes among 
people from the bocage, from the valley, and from Angers (not to 
mention the long-act ive quarry workers in Angers ' hinterland) 
occasionally broke into Anjou' s collective action. On the whole, 
however, during the.twentieth century divided Anjou has stood out 
from the Ile de France, Languedoc, Flanders, and Burgundy for its 
people's relative inaction. 
Flanders, on the other hand, remained hyperactive. Through 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, 
Flanders saw the construction and deconstruction of the French 
state through war far more often and more directly than the other 
four provinces. Beginning as Habsburg property, changing hands 
time after time, fortified and occupied over and over again, 
echoing repeatedly to the boots of marching armies, paying at 
least thrice -- in destruction, in confiscation, in taxation -- 
for every war, Flanders learned the connections between warmaking 
and statemaking first hand. 
Flanders also became France's densest site successively for 
commercialized agriculture, cottage textile production, 
large-scale coal mining, and capital-intensive manufacturi.ng. The 
region served as a proving ground for French capitalism. 
proletarian collective action, both rural and urban, reached 
greater heights there than in any of the other regions. With the 
twentieth century, we find Flanders fostering militant 
working-class politics and consistently joining the Paris region 
at the head of national strike movements. Lille, Roubaix, 
Halluin, Douai, Valenciennes and other cities of  landers helped 
write the history of French working-class politics. 
Burgundy stood aloof. On their own grounds, Burgundy's 
winegrowers acted repeatedly to defend their interests. During 
the nineteenth century, such wine centers as Beaune became hotbeds 
of republican politics. Workers of ~ontceau-les-Mines and Le 
Creusot connected well with national workers' movements. (Le 
Creusot, after all, organized its own Commune in 1871.) Yet with 
the steady deindustrialization of the ~h$tillonais and other 
sections of Burgundy, workers in the isolated centers of 
capital-intensive production had few potential allies within the 
region. Nor did winegrowers maintain militancy into the twentieth 
century. As Languedoc' s winegrowers were pressing their demands 
by the hundreds of thousands in 1907, those of Burgundy tended 
their vines. 
Back to Burgundy 
It was not always so. Think back to Dijon and Burgundy in 
the 1620s. City and province were prosperous enough to attract 
the interest of Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIII. Their campaign 
to reimpose royal rule on the cities and grandees of provincial 
France was succeeding; many Protestant strongholds of Languedoc, 
for example, had lost their near-autonomy, Now their plans were 
turning to the possibility of gaining ground in the great war 
involving their neighbor states. That would' take even more money 
than their domestic military campaigns. 
From 1628 on, the king's chief minister sought to raise royal 
revenue from Burgundy in two connected ways: by demanding direct 
grants for particular expenses such as maintaining troops in the 
province, and by substituting nicely cooperative Elections for the 
reluctant tax-gathering activity of the Estates. The Elections 
had the additional attraction, from the crown's point of view, of 
permitting the sale of a number of expensive offices. On the 
first count, individual communities pleaded repeatedly that having 
lodged, fed, and transported troops out of their own resources, 
they should not also be taxed. The Estates (with the cooperation 
of the Duc de Bellegarde, royal governor) put pressure on the 
communities. But they also tried to foil the demands for payment 
with legal maneuvers such as challenging the form of the request 
.or the manner of its delivery. 
On the question of Elections, the Estates cheered Louis XI11 
and Richelieu when they came to ~ i j o n  on 31 January 1629, but 
sought thereafter to block the impending royal decree. In 
February 1630 they were still, for example, insisting on having 
the original of the decree instead of a certified copy. They were 
also calling for an assembly of Burgundy's cities to resist the 
installation of the Election. By that time, however, the decree's 
enactment looked imminent. Word spread that the new officials 
would impose a tax on wine. 
Di jon's Mardi Gras celebration of 1630 went on in the midst 
of that contest between province and crown. On 19 February, the 
civic militia dispersed crowds that had gathered to complain about 
the impending increase in t'axes. Dijon's people elected 
winegrower Anatoire Changenet (or Champgenet) their King of Fools. 
He led the festival. At the end of the celebrations, according to 
an eighteenth-century account, 
On the evening of 28 February 1630 there began in the city of 
Dijon a sedition carried out by a troop of winegrowers who 
first smashed the main gate of a private house, then went 
away threatening to come back the following morning. On 
Friday 1 March, easily and without resistance, they attacked 
the houses of many of the King's officers, including that of 
the Parlement ' s First President, opened them up, burned the 
furniture inside and continued until the Parlement and the 
chief officials and burghers regained courage as they saw 
their own danger, and put down the rebels. They acted late, 
having long been able to foresee said sedition because they 
knew the plans of the rebels, and because they had received 
.,~ 
the warning of the previous night's attack (AMD I 118). 
The "private house" people stoned and smashed on the 28th belonged 
to a royal financial officer. 
Changenet had worn his garish King of Fools costume into the 
fray. He and his subjects-for-a-day had marched to the offender's 
house with drums and sharpened vine-stakes. They had sung 
"Lanturelu" as they came. The following morning they had sounded 
the tocsin in working-class neighborhoods, and helped allies from 
outside the city to enter by climbing over the walls. Only then 
did the attacks on royal officer's houses begin. Later, the crowd 
went at the homes of city officials -- many of whom owned the 
vineyards in which the city's winegrowers worked. The authorities 
did, indeed, have ample warning that popular contention was taking 
a violent turn. 
After the fact, Dijon's officialdom apparently worried about 
(:%?< 
their tardiness; as soon as tr'?iops had put down the insurrection, 
they took measures to punish the culprits and to seek pardon from 
the king. Richelieu and Louis XIII, however, knew a good 
opportunity when they saw one. For the king's arrival to accept 
the municipality's apologies, the Duc de Bellegarde brought the 
following stipulations: 1) all the city's. cannon would be locked 
up in the castle; 2) the city could not sound its bells at the 
king's entry; 3) the city could not send a delegation out to greet 
His Majesty; 4) royal troops, not municipal guards, would man the 
city's gates; 5) all winegrowers would leave the city. 
Equally important, the royal decree establishing an Election 
went into effect almost immediately. From that point on, the 
Estates sent delegations asking' for the cancellation of the edict. 
Their negotiations got them nowhere until May 1631, when they 
finally arranged to buy back the decree for 1.6 million livres -- 
a tidy sum, at a time when a bushel of wheat sold for a livre and 
a laborer earned half a livre for a day's work. 1.6 million 
bushels of wheat would pay a lot of troops. 
Meanwhile, royal agents sustained the pressure for revenues. 
On 17 August 1630, the Duc de Bellegarde refused to divert troops 
on their way to Piedmont from the province; he threatened to have 
them live on the land. The Estates .promptly, agreed to borrow 
20,000 livres for the expenses of troops. That was a standard 
seventeenth-century negotiation, the Lanturelu an extreme case of 
a very common routine, The city's bourgeoisie did what they could 
do to shrug off royal demands, or pass them on to the poor. 
. --& 
Dijon's ordinary people (,.. j felt the pressure of royal . ,'-'--a? 
aggrandizement directly. They acted against it when they could. 
Royal finance, provincial administration, city security, 
winegrowers' everyday life, and popular insurrection converged in 
a single event. That connection of the largest processes 
transforming France and the collective action of ordinary people 
exposes the fallacy of treating "violence", "protest", or 
"disorder" as a world apart, as a phenomenon distinct from high 
politics, as mere reaction to stress, There lies the most 
important teaching of popular collective action: It is not at 
epiphenomenon. It connects directly and solidly with the great 
questions of power. a That discovery gives us a good reason to 
search the archives for the contention of ordinary French people. 
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